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Abstract
According to some interpretations of Islam supported by gender activists, the veil 
can be perceived as a passport that enables women to participate in public affairs. 
This argument has been overlooked by the courts, including the European Court of 
 Human Rights. The latter has adopted a discourse that considers the veil to be a threat 
to public order and gender equality, and more recently, an obstacle to social cohesion. 
By doing so, the Court has excluded veiled European Muslim women from the public 
sphere. The Court has justified curbing freedom of religion by granting states a wide 
margin of appreciation on the basis of the concept of “living together.” I argue that the 
Court needs to take the “passport veil” into account to be consistent with its argument 
on living together. A shift of approach and discourse would constitute a new way of 
understanding integration through the veil.
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1 Introduction
Recent cases have shown that veiled Muslim women face challenges in the 
European public sphere.1 In the name of social cohesion, or of “living together,” 
1 See, e.g., Cass., Soc., 19 Mars 2013, Mme Fatima X…, épouse Y… c/ L’Association Baby Loup, 
No 11-28.845; the s.a.s. v. France 43835/11 echr (01 July 2014); the decision of the Spanish 
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le vivre ensemble, as referred to by French and Belgian authorities, they are en-
couraged to integrate into society. The relevant domestic and European case 
law, however, has indicated that women wearing a full or partial veil (all cat-
egories and types included, from the chale to the burqa) have limited women’s 
access to education and work.2 Muslim women are consequently caught be-
tween two prohibitions: one dictated by expectations and demands stemming 
from their beliefs or their community, the other dictated by courts, such as the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), and by domestic law.3 Women are 
told both to veil and not to veil, and their access to the public sphere is moni-
tored, if not restricted. As a result, it seems that European Muslim women who 
wear the veil are expected to choose between their beliefs and integration. 
They are torn between “overlapping systems of identification.”4 This is not a 
new phenomenon, and it was already denounced in the context of colonialism 
by those like Fannon in his mask analogy.5 The novelty resides in the attempt 
to resolve this tension by encouraging courts to consider alternative readings 
of the veil. The aim of this article is to encourage legal professionals to embrace 
a scenario in which the veil is understood as contributing to women’s empow-
erment rather than as a threat to equality or national security. The article relies 
on Muslim feminists’ writings that provide interpretations seeking to reconcile 
faith with gender equality . The veil then becomes a passport (I call it a “pass-
port veil”), enabling women to cross the border between the private and the 
public spheres, the religious and the secular spheres, all along respecting their 
own values. Such an interpretation could make it possible for courts to view 
the phenomenon of the veil differently.6
This article forms the basis for an experimental testing of the attitude of 
a secular court toward the religious narrative of the veil as a tool of women’s 
 Supreme Court overturning a city ban on face-covering veils in municipal buildings (Aso-
ciación Watani para la Libertad y la Justicia v. Lleida, Tribunal Supremo, Sala de lo Contencio-
so-Administrativo, Sección: Séptima, 06 Febrero 2013, Recurso casacion Numero: 4118/2011); 
and B and M v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2013] ewhc 2281 (Admin).
2 See ECtHR decisions: Karaduman v. Turkey, App. No. 16278/90, 74 Eur. Comm´n H.R. Dec & 
Rep 93 (1993); Dahlab v. Switzerland, 42393/98 [2001] Eur Ct H R 449 (15 February 2001); Şahin 
v. Turkey, 44774/98 [2004] Eur Ct H R 299 (29 June 2004).
3 For example, the French law criminalizing the wearing of face veils: loi n° 2010–1192 du 11 
October 2010 interdisant la dissimulation du visage dans l’espace public.
4 Ayelet Shachar, “Privatizing Diversity: A Cautionary Tale from Religious Arbitration in Family 
Law”, 9(2) Theor Inq Law (2008), 573.
5 Frantz Fanon, Black Skin, White Mask (1952).
6 Will Kymlicka and Raphael Cohen-Almagor, “Democracy and Multiculturalism”, in R. Cohen-
Almagor (ed.), Challenges to Democracy: Essays in Honour and Memory of Isaiah Berlin (2000).
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empowerment. To frame this scenario, I need to set aside set aside existing 
interpretations of Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(echr) by the ECtHR, which has prevented accommodating the veil. I sug-
gest changing the way we perceive religion, and move toward accommodation, 
seeking to understand how religion can play a positive role when interpreting 
the Convention.7 This experiment represents an opportunity to promote cul-
tural diversity in the judicial narrative.8 The ECtHR, for example, in Chapman 
v. the United Kingdom,9 has referred to the concept of cultural diversity. The 
article seeks to put into action the judges’ words in the Chapman case, where 
they considered the protection of the lifestyle and identity of minorities as 
“a cultural diversity of value to the whole community.”10 I therefore challenge 
existing limitations when adjudicating minorities’ issues in courts by asking 
“what if?:” What if the ECtHR were to consider an internal religious narrative 
such as the one promoted by Islamic feminists? What benefits could be reaped 
from listening to other ideas and perspectives on the veil? I believe that secular 
judges, guided by experts, can understand Muslim women’s pleas and prac-
tice multiculturalism while engaging with interculturalism in courts and their 
judgments. Some British courts have considered such narratives, as demon-
strated by the decision in 2017 that led a judge to severely limit visitation rights 
of a transgender woman on the grounds that it would cause harm to children 
belonging to a Jewish ultra-Orthodox community.11 My argument is to be un-
derstood as a contribution to multiculturalism, looking at a judicial effort to 
protect veiled European Muslim women, and to interculturalism, considering 
the role of the judiciary in supporting the circulation of other views and the 
evolution of culture through law. Both multiculturalism and interculturalism 
can be achieved by taking into account internal religious perspectives that are 
called to play a role in a secular environment.
The ECtHR constitutes an excellent forum for this experiment. The aim is 
not to establish the ECtHR as the authoritative body when it comes to deciding 
on Muslim issues, nor to institute a neo-imperialist approach that could lead to 
European judges deciding what Islam is. The ECtHR is intended to protect hu-
man rights, operating in a secular environment while deciding, among others, 
7 George Letsas, “Accommodating What Needn’t Be Special”, 10(2) L. & Eth. H.R. (2016), 319.
8 See the 2001 unesco Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity: http://portal.unesco 
.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=13179&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html
9 Chapman v. the United Kingdom, 27238/95 [2001] Eur Ct H R 43 (30 January 2001).
10 Ibid., § 93.
11 J.B. and The Children (Ultra-Orthodox Judaism: Transgender) [2017] ewfc 4, 30 January 
2017.
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on religious issues. It finds itself in a unique position, having to examine sub-
jective considerations with regard to religion, culture, and traditions, while up-
holding the democratic and human rights values enshrined in the echr. The 
Court has reviewed such cases applying tests like the margin of appreciation. It 
is therefore in a position to hear the internal religious perspective of European 
Muslim women while protecting European values, practicing multiculturalism 
and interculturalism on the basis of a cross-cultural dialogue.
This experiment calls for a reappraisal of the stories of Senay Karaduman, 
Lucia Dahlab, and Leyla Şahin (to name a few), each of whom sought to grad-
uate, work, or receive an education, but was denied the opportunity by the 
 ECtHR. Most Muslim women living in Europe seek to be empowered and want 
to contribute to society. One of their strategies is to redefine their identities 
that have become plural: they need to accommodate Islam with the values 
of the country they live in, working at two levels.12 I suggest that the judges 
should have considered alternative religious narratives, while honouring the 
principles laid out in the Convention. My argument in this experiment is that 
law-making could rely on contextualized gender views.13 Having established 
that Islamic feminism and the passport veil could provide a culturally or reli-
giously sensitive solution to the integration of Muslim women, I argue that the 
ECtHR should be encouraged to look at gender and Islam from an inclusive 
perspective, concentrating on contextualized needs, which in turn can lead to 
a consideration of Islamic feminism.
2 Gender Jihad: Addressing Muslim Women’s Rights
To sustain the argument that an internal religious perspective should be con-
sidered by a secular court, it is necessary to understand this religious narrative’s 
role vis-à-vis some European Muslim women, with reference to empowerment. 
This part also outlines the strategy of the passport veil, a term I propose to use.
2.1 Islamic Feminism and the Passport Veil
Islamic feminism exists throughout the Muslim world, and its supporters have 
achieved some important breakthroughs. They use Muslim legal techniques to 
examine sources of law from a gender-oriented perspective, then reinterpret 
12 Amber E. Kinser, “Negotiating Spaces for/through Third-Wave Feminism”, 16(3) nwsa 
Journal (2004), 124.
13 Hillary Charlesworth and Chirstine Chinkin, The Boundaries of International Law: a Femi-
nist Analysis (2000), 62.
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the tradition in light of gender equality. The benefit of referring to Islamic texts 
is that it enables women to seek equality and empowerment within the Islamic 
framework, remaining faithful to their religious beliefs and identity while look-
ing for what they believe is duly theirs in Islam. As summarized by Wadud, 
Islamic feminisms (there are different approaches to feminism in Islam), are 
gender policies that encourages women’s active participation in the tradition, 
so that their needs, realities, and experiences can be reflected in their interpre-
tations; it is about how we live vs. how we are supposed to live.14 Islamic femi-
nism provides a context for the passport veil: the narrative advanced by these 
gender activists is grounded in the reality of many Muslim women, reflecting 
their needs or expectations. This is why the ECtHR should look into Islamic 
feminism when appraising the veil: it would help explain how some European 
Muslim women approach their own religion and understand their contribu-
tion as citizens. Understanding the passport veil helps contextualise certain 
claims made by some of the veiled women seeking adjudication of their claim 
that the veil is a liberating tool.
Part of the argument on the passport veil as a liberating tool is the use of 
the veil to cross borders, or walk along the boundary that separates the pri-
vate sphere from the public sphere. Here, the private sphere is defined as the 
family, friends and community. In the private space, one can contribute to the 
“production and performance of cultural identities.”15 The public space in-
cludes streets, shops, as well as areas that are vetted by the community, such as 
mosques. Yet this distinction is somewhat unhelpful when it comes to Islam as 
what happens in a public space such as a mosque can influence the behavior 
of a woman at home. The public/private narrative is therefore multidimen-
sional and I have adapted it to this article so that the public sphere remains 
the space where veiled Muslim women interact with the state.16 When using 
the passport to cross the border between the private and the public, women 
introduce a new narrative into the environment of the state as they seek to 
14 Amina Wadud, “Islamic Feminism”. Paper presented at Cornell College. 22 April 2010. 
Retrieved 15 February 2017, http://news.cornellcollege.edu/2010/04/amina-wadud-talks 
-about-islamic-feminism/.
15 Ayona Datta, “Making Space for Muslims: housing Bangladeshi families in East London”, 
in R. Phililips (ed.), Muslim Spaces of Hope: Geographies of possibilities in Britain and the 
West (2009).
16 Shachar noted that the threshold for crossing from the private to the public is far from 
clear, and cited the work of Frances E. Olsen, “The Family and the Market: A Study of 
Ideology and Legal Reform”, 96 Harv L Rev (1983), 1497, in Ayelet Shachar, “On Citizenship 
and Multicultural Vulnerability”, 28:1 Pol Theory (2000), 64–89.
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construct their own identity in the public space.17 Against this backdrop, the 
public space becomes a location where the state is deployed and where the 
majority rules, as clearly stated by the Court when using the “living together” 
yardstick in the case law analyzed below. Negotiating the passage from the 
private sphere, where the family and the community are often omnipresent, 
to the public space, which is often somewhat secular, presents different chal-
lenges for men and women. Crossing the borders can prove awkward for both 
if external signs of belonging are present in the form of a veil or some other 
pieces of clothing.
Besides reading the intentions of the Prophet and looking into the philoso-
phy of Islam with regard to gender equality, Islamic feminists insist on tak-
ing into account the context in which women live. Wadud suggested that the 
veil is to be understood within the culture and the context;18 she analyzed the 
meaning of the veil in each context and went through the phases of veiling 
and unveiling that an individual experiences. This demonstrates the diversity 
of the motivations for wearing the veil.19 These motivations were exposed in 
the sas and the Belcacemi and Oussar cases.20 Fakhro suggested using Sharur’s 
theory of the maximum and the minimum of tolerable limits of acceptability, 
to check whether the veil is to be worn in a certain context: a naked woman 
and an entirely covered woman are outside the spectrum of respectability, and 
a woman must adapt her veiling to the context in which she lives.21 This ap-
proach demonstrates the array of possibilities when it comes to accommodat-
ing the veil.
Can this form of empowerment provided by Islamic feminisms serve some 
European Muslim women, especially before the courts? Or is this struggle for 
gender equality too specific to Islam, and incompatible with the mission and 
purpose of the ECtHR?
2.2 Emancipation and the Veil
Part of the perception of the veil as an instrument for emancipation is a reac-
tion to recent history, when the veil was either perceived as an instrument of 
17 Caroline Nagel and Lynn Staeheli, “British Arab Perspectives on religion, politics and the 
‘public’”, in P. Hopkins and R. Gale (eds.), Muslims in Britain: Race, Place and Identities: 
Race, Place and Identities (2013), 96.
18 Amina Wadud, Qur’an and Woman: Rereading the Sacred Text from a Woman’s Perspective 
(New York, 1999).
19 Wadud, supra note 35.
20 Belcacemi and Oussar v. Belgium, 37798/13 [2017] Eur Ct H R (11 July 2017); Dakir v. Bel-
gium 4619/12 [2017] Eur Ct H R (11 July 2017).
21 Munira Fakhro, “Gulf Women and Islamic Law”, in M .Yamani (ed.), Feminism and Islam: 
Legal and Literary Perspectives (1996), 253–254.
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resistance or as a means of preventing empowerment, as illustrated by the 2010 
French law. The veil as a passport is a radically different approach: it describes 
the veil as being owned by women. Rather than being part of a nationalistic 
discourse in a (post-) colonial environment, Muslim women have given a new 
meaning to being veiled, considering it as the opportunity to cross borders, 
and thus becoming autonomous individuals and citizens. This perception 
builds on the idea that the veil “form(s) part of Muslim women’s character, be-
haviour and identity.”22 In this regard, the passport veil empowers us to think 
of veiled European Muslim women as individuals, rather than analyzing them 
from a collective or Euro-centric perspective. Therefore, women should not be 
considered objects on which we project our theories about emancipation or 
resistance, which is why it is important to consider alternative theories such as 
the one of the passport veil.
This is the context in which some Islamic feminists think about the veil as 
an empowering instrument: the veil should be interpreted first as a choice, 
then as a way of gaining societal mobility. As submitted by sas in her case at 
the ECtHR, the idea that a woman covering her face is “incompatible with the 
principle of gender equality […] is simplistic. She added that the wearing the 
veil could denote emancipation, self-assertion and participation in society; far 
from wearing the veil to reinforce patriarchy, sas believes she did it because 
of her own faith and stated that she was being “denied the right to exist as in-
dividuals in public, when in the majority of cases it was worn voluntarily and 
without any proselytising motive.”23 In Belcacemi and Oussar v. Belgium, both 
women explained that they wore the full veil by choice.24 Ms. Dakir expressed 
the same motivation and choice.25 Both appellants also explained the effect 
that the Belgian law had on their lives, effectively depriving them of the pass-
port that would enable them to cross borders.26 By adopting this strategy of 
wearing the veil, Islamic feminists and gender activists challenge the conser-
vative agenda through the reappropriation of “the veil as a means to facilitate 
social presence rather than seclusion.”27 Such stances illustrate Shachar’s ar-
gument that there is room for enhancing minorities’ autonomies through the 
22 Rajnara Akhtar, “Islam and the Veil: Theoretical and Regional Contexts”, in T. Gabrial and 
R. Hannan (eds.), Islam and the Veil: Theoretical and Regional Contexts (2011), 149.
23 sas v France, § 77.
24 Belcacemi and Oussar v. Belgium, § 6.
25 Dakir v. Belgium, § 7.
26 Ibid., § 9–10.
27 Nayereh Tohidi, “The issues at hand”, in H. L. Bodman and N.E. Tohidi (eds.), Women in 
Muslim Societies: Diversity Within Unity (1998), 284.
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courts.28 It is to be noted that in sas v France, the Court heard this argument 
and rejected the notion that the veil contradicts gender equality, stating that 
“a State Party cannot invoke gender equality in order to ban a practice that is 
defended by women—such as the applicant—in the context of the exercise of 
the rights enshrined in those provisions, unless it were to be understood that 
individuals could be protected on that basis from the exercise of their own 
fundamental rights and freedoms.”29 The veil is consequently, in many ways, 
a symbol of Islamic feminisms, as demonstrated on social media and various 
blog entries and articles.30 This is why Ahmed spoke of the Islamic dress as a 
sign of “educational and professional upward mobility” and a “practical cop-
ing strategy, enabling women to negotiate in the new world while affirming 
the traditional values of their upbringings.”31 She called this empowerment a 
“quiet revolution.”32 Indeed, it is when women “reclaim their own cultures, in-
terpreting texts and traditions in self-empowering ways… [that] women may 
truly claim their rights.”33 Silvestri notes that while Muslim women battled 
against the veil as an imposition, others considered it as “a path to emancipa-
tion, whereby Muslim women assert their right to free choice and stand up 
for and articulate their own human rights within a secular context.”34 Kapur 
has also said “the veil has also been a very empowering symbol for Muslim 
women in some countries… Amongst immigrant communities in the West, it 
is the symbol of an exclusive cultural space and a rejection of assimilation.”35 
Odeh concluded that “unless I engaged in intellectual elitism and accused 
28 Aylet Shachar, Multicultural Jurisdictions: Cultural Differences And Women’s Rights 
(2001), 3.
29 sas v. France, § 119.
30 Nadiya Takolia, “The hijab has liberated me from society’s expectations of women”, The 
Guardian. 28 May 2012. Retrieved 15 February 2017, http://www.theguardian.com/commen-
tisfree/2012/may/28/hijab-society-women-religious-political; Pina Sadar, “Muslim Femi-
nists reclaim the hijab in fight against patriarchy”, The Conversation. 26 September 2014. 
Retrieved 15 February 2017, http://theconversation.com/muslim-feminists-reclaim-the 
-hijab-to-fight-the-patriarchy-31126
31 Ibid.
32 Leila Ahmed, A Quiet Revolution: The Veil’s Resurgence, from the Middle East to America 
(2011).
33 Mahnaz Afkhami and Haleh Vaziri, Victories Over Violence: Ensuring Safety for Women and 
Girls A Practitioner’s Manual (1998), 9.
34 Sara Silvestri, “Unveiled Issues: Reflections From A Comparative Pilot Study On Europe’s 
Muslim Women”, City University London Working Papers on Transnational Politics. April 
2009. Retrieved 15 February 2017, https://www.city.ac.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0016/ 
84040/CUWPTP005A.pdf.
35 Ratna Kapur, Erotic Justice: Law and the New Politics of Colonialism (2005), 107.
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those women of false consciousness and of not knowing their own good, there 
was no way I could point to instances of the disempowerment of the veil.”36 
And El Guindi concluded that the veil “is feminist because it seeks to liberate 
womanhood.”37
2.3 Of the use of the Passport Veil
To fully understand the challenge the ECtHR faces when ruling in cases involv-
ing the veil, and to comprehend the scope and stakes of my experiment, it is 
useful to understand how the passport veil functions. I suggest that a secular 
court consider an internal religious perspective in the name of multicultural-
ism. It is therefore necessary to analyze in depth how a product of that internal 
religious narrative works, and to see whether it could be considered by the 
courts.
The veil is a complex, subtle, and flexible instrument for negotiating spaces, 
borders, and plural identities, and it can empower women in a trade-off, or a 
strategic choice as explained by Aksoy and Gambetta.38 The idea of a trade-off 
emerges from the work of Abu Odeh, who suggested that veiling was used as 
a way for women to prevent sexual harassment in public.39 In such instances, 
women use the veil for a given purpose and with the view of gaining a certain 
outcome.40 Therefore, rather than limiting myself to the veil as a metaphor for 
Muslim women,41 I use it as a tool for negotiating freedom, which why I speak 
of crossing borders. To contextualize this trade-off is to argue that European 
Muslim women wear the veil, and in return expected the opportunity to play 
a social role in a secular sphere while upholding their religious beliefs. This 
is well expressed by the Belgian women who lodged an application with the 
ECtHR against the 2011 law that banned veiling: one of them had chosen to 
remove her veil during the proceedings to be able to keep entering the public 
space. Her rational was that she had family responsibilities that meant she had 
to be visible in the public space and it has seemed to her best to remove her veil 
36 Lama Abu Odeh, “Post-Colonial Feminism and the Veil: Considering the Differences”, 
26 New Eng. L. Rev. (1991–92), 1527, 1532.
37 Fadwa El Guindi, Veil: Modesty, Privacy and Resistance (1999), 184.
38 Ozan Aksoy and Diego Gambetta, “Behind the Veil: The Startegic Use of Religious Garb”, 
6:1 Eur Sociol Rev (2016), 792.
39 Abu Odeh supra note 80, 1530–1531.
40 Lila Abu-Lughod, Remaking Women: Feminism and Modernity in the Middle East (1998), 
252.
41 Susie Hawkins, “The Essence of the Veil: The Veil as a Metaphor for Islamic Women in 
Voices”, in E. M. Caner (ed.) Behind the Veil: The World of Islam Through the Eyes of Women 
(2003), 93–106.
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in the meantime to avoid being arrested or being stigmatised. The other lady 
has chosen to keep the veil and realise that she couldn’t leave her home as her 
passport veil had been removed from her.42
The circumstances of the trade-off must be understood so that empower-
ment can logically follow from them: for women for whom the veil is compul-
sory, this trade-off means access to public space.43 The veil gives them a degree 
of autonomy through the protection it grants, without fear of community or 
family sanctions.44 This autonomy creates room for empowerment, provid-
ing women access to employment and education.45 The trade-off empowers 
women further when they cross the border back from the public to the private 
space. Duval described an increase in mobility:46 having been exposed to the 
“other” in European secular spheres, Muslim women are empowered to nego-
tiate at home, and even defy authority.47 These women indicate that wearing 
the veil is a way of complying with family or community expectations, expect-
ing in return some recognition in the private sphere.48 This could lead to a 
renegotiation of gender relationships.49 This trade-off is illustrated by veiled 
young women attending universities in exchange for postponing marriage. For 
women who have willingly embraced the veil, veiling becomes a way of assert-
ing their cultural or religious identity while integrating50 in Western society 
and taking control of their private and public lives.51 With access to the social 
sphere, the trade-off could play a constructive role in building integration and 
citizenship: the veil helps create a negotiated identity.52 This is why veiling is 
42 [full reference] Belcacemi and Oussar v. Belgium, § 9–10.
43 Fadwa El Guindi, “Veiling infitah with Muslim ethic: Egypt's contemporary Islamic move-
ment”, 28(4) Social Problems (1980), 465–485, 482
44 Katherine Bullock, Rethinking Muslim Women and the Veil: Challenging Historical & Mod-
ern Stereotypes (2002), 185; Carrie Rosefsky Wickam, Mobilizing Islam: Religion, Activism, 
and Political Change in Egypt (2002), 133.
45 Asma Afsaruddin, Hermeneutics and Honor: negotiating female “public” space in Islamic/
ate societies (1999), 19; Soroya Duval, “New veils and new voices: Islamist women’s groups 
in Egypt”, in K. Ask and M. Tjomsland (eds.), Women and Islamization: Contemporary 
Dimensions of Discourses on Gender Relations (1998), 45–72, 63.
46 Duval, ibid., 63.
47 Afsaruddin supra note 93, 16.
48 El Guindi supra note 91, 79; Afsaruddin, supra note 93, 7.
49 Duval, supra note 93, 63.
50 Ibid., 61.
51 Afsaruddin, supra note 93, 16.
52 Valorie K. Vojdik, “Politics of the Headscarf in Turkey: Masculinities, Feminism and the 
Construction of Collective Identities”, 33 Harv J L & Gender (2010), 661–685, 664.
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generally discussed by Muslim feminist scholars in relation to the woman as a 
subject, in addition to a discussion with respect to the social fabric.
Crossing borders with the aid of the veil means transcending the private-
public divide. Admittedly, it has at times been associated with other dichot-
omies such as “us/them” or “Muslim/European values.” A source of these 
 dichotomies is to be found in yet another dichotomy, that of “honour/shame,” 
which provides guidelines about how a woman should behave.53 Women are 
expected to behave in a way that upholds their honour as well as that of the 
family and the community. Crawley summed it up by stating that “dress is the 
most distinctive expression in a material form of the various grades of social 
life. The biological period thus becomes a social period of existence and the 
individual is merged in a functional section of the community.”54 As a result, 
the veil has been used to control women’s bodies,55 to separate them from the 
rest of the society.56 This control, which could arguably amount to oppression, 
has been emphasized in conservative interpretations of Islamic scriptures per-
taining to the veil. This means that the ECtHR is correct when it denounces the 
veil as a tool of oppression (as explained below); yet, when the court does so, 
it considers only some of the interpretations provided by some Muslim Con-
servative clerics. It examines only conservative readings of Islam, and ignores 
Muslim feminist readings. If the judges were to listen to women’s narratives on 
empowerment, they would become aware of the fact that by using the veil as a 
means to achieving emancipation, women negotiate the framework of shame 
and honour. This manipulation of the private/public divide and of other di-
vides is central to feminist resistance57 and crucial to understanding the stakes 
in the case of some Muslim women’s path to empowerment. With the passport 
veil, Muslim women turn the argument of the veil as an instrument of protec-
tion from the male gaze on its head: they accept wearing it to be protected in 
public, and in exchange expect to fully contribute to social activities. The veil 
becomes more than a passport to cross the divide; it also becomes a way of 
controlling one’s destiny through appropriation of the public space.58 Consid-
ering the passport veil enables us to understand why some women decide to 
53 El Guindi, supra note 91, 79.
54 Alfred Ernest Crawley, Dress, drinks and drums (1931), 117.
55 Fatima Mernissi, L’amour dans les pays musulmans (2009), 74.
56 Fatima Mernissi, Women and Islam: A historical and theological enquiry (1991), 178–9.
57 Shirley Ardener, Women and space: Ground rules and social maps (1981), 3; Afsaruddin, 
supra note 93, Introduction.
58 Duval, supra note 93, 63.
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appeal to the courts to protect their right to wear a veil: they seek validation 
from the state apparatus of their internal narrative.
Although the argument of the passport veil has been presented by appli-
cants to the ECtHR, the Court did not approach the veil as an instrument of 
empowerment, but rather as a form of oppression that has a negative effect on 
gender equality. By doing so, the Court denied veiled women the opportunity 
to pursue personal autonomy through alternative means. The sas v. France 
case raised hope for a change, as the Court did not discard the argument of 
empowerment, but decided that “living together” superseded it. In subsequent 
case law concerning Belgium, in 2017, however, the judges did not elaborate on 
the choice made by women, and chose instead to develop the “living together” 
concept.
3 Consequences of the Approach of the Court: Stereotyping and 
Exclusion
The early case law of the Court demonstrates a stereotyped understanding of 
Islam and the veil. It used well-established yardsticks to justify its balanced ap-
proach, finding equilibrium between freedom of religion and state interests, as 
the two 2017 cases concerning Belgium demonstrated. In the cases from 2017, 
the ECtHR missed an opportunity to develop its view on women’s empower-
ment, choosing instead to develop the concept of living together. This is why 
I frame my work as an experiment: I seek to demonstrate what would happen 
if the ECtHR were to accommodate a certain religious approach in an intercul-
tural spirit (knowing that others may raise the issue of selecting which inter-
cultural narrative we should listen to), being aware of the subjectivity of the 
concept of the passport veil, given that not all Muslims adhere to it.
3.1 Stereotyping the Veil: Overview of ECtHR Case Law
The ECtHR has had to decide on cases involving the veil. It has often done so by 
portraying the veil and Islam negatively, as for example in Karaduman v. Tur-
key, where the Commission stated that “where secular universities have laid 
down dress regulations for students, they may ensure that certain fundamen-
talist religious movements do not disturb public order in higher education or 
impinge on the beliefs of others.”59 This balance, however, has been reached on 
weak grounds because the Court opted for a conservative portrayal of Islam, ig-
noring the positive and reformist Muslim elements, such as Islamic feminism. 
59 Karaduman v. Turkey, pp. 107–108.
0004285752.INDD   224 1/25/2019   3:00:12 PM
 225Approach of the European Court of Human Rights
journal of law, religion and state 7 (2019) 213-241
204331
The Court did not take into consideration the fact that there is a liberal form 
of Islam, which could be in agreement with the democratic and human rights 
purposes of the echr.
ECtHR jurisprudence also reveals a stereotypical view of the veil. For ex-
ample, it depicts it as “powerful external symbol.”60 Measuring the effect of the 
veil on young children when worn by a teacher, the Court stated that:
[I]t cannot be denied outright that the wearing of a headscarf might have 
some kind of proselytising effect, seeing that it appears to be imposed 
on women by a precept which is laid down in the Koran and which… 
is hard to square with the principle of gender equality. It therefore ap-
pears difficult to reconcile the wearing of an Islamic headscarf with the 
message of tolerance, respect for others and, above all, equality and non-
discrimination that all teachers in a democratic society must convey to 
their pupils.61
The ECtHR viewed the headscarf as the symbol of a religion, which is only one 
interpretation of veiling, but which also happens to be the understanding prof-
fered by many conservative Muslim interpreters.62 With such statements, the 
Court merely confirms traditional and patriarchal Muslim readings, and can 
conclude only that the veil is contrary to gender equality and empowerment. 
The Court therefore silenced the women, denying them the possibility to be 
autonomous bodies, because they are perceived as being subjected to an ex-
ternal compelling force. The veil is also perceived as a threat to public order. In 
Karaduman, the veil was described as an aggressive symbol, capable of creat-
ing social conflict, and wearing the veil could challenge those who do not wear 
one.63 In Şahin, it was described as threatening democratic values:
The Court also notes that in the decisions in Karaduman and Dahlab, 
the Convention institutions found that in a democratic society the State 
was entitled to place restrictions on the wearing of the Islamic headscarf 
60 Dahlab v. Switzerland.
61 [ full citation] Dahlab v. Switzerland.
62 For an in-depth analysis of the new hermeneutics on the veil, see the work by the Leba-
nese scholar, Zin al-Din, who found 10 different interpretations of the verses of the Quran 
in relation to veiling, as cited in Shabaan (Bouthaina Shabaan, “The Muted Voices of 
Women Interpreters”, in Mahnaz Afkhami (ed.), Faith and Freedom: Women’s Human 
Rights in the Muslim World (1995), 61–77.)
63 Karaduman v. Turkey, 108.
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if it was incompatible with the pursued aim of protecting the rights and 
freedoms of others, public order and public safety.64
Another rationale the Court used to justify its approach to the veil was the 
general context of the rise of Islamism. In Karaduman, a student could not 
receive her degree because of her photo, in which she appeared veiled. The 
Commission noted that the university enforced secular rules to ensure har-
mony among students, during times of rising extremism.65 In Leyla Şahin, a 
university student was not allowed to take her exams because she wished to 
wear her hijab, in violation of the law. The ban against the hijab relied on the 
Refah Partisi case, which does not address the veil but Islamism, and was justi-
fied by the attempt of the state to curb the influence of extremism. The judges 
stated in the Refah Partisi that “the Court does not lose sight of the fact that 
there are extremist political movements in Turkey which seek to impose on 
society as a whole their religious symbols and conception of a society founded 
on religious precepts.”66 This argument is mentioned also in the sas case, in 
relation to the legislative history of the French law of 2010 banning full-face 
veiling. The Belgian cases brought in 2017 also fall back on the security argu-
ment. Thus, the veil has consistently been associated with extremism. In so do-
ing, the Court endorsed a single narrative according to which the veil is a risk 
to democracy, and never sought to look into the counter-narrative, that the veil 
can contribute to democracy, indirectly endorsing the philosophy supported 
by the French and Belgian veil bans that the veil is a threat to the social fab-
ric and to democracy. As summed up by Judge Tulkens, “the headscarf cannot 
be associated with fundamentalism… Not all women who wear the headscarf 
are fundamentalists and there is nothing to suggest that the applicant held 
fundamentalist views.”67 By side-lining the women who petitioned the ECtHR 
to adjudicate their claim that wearing the veil is part of their human rights, 
the Court missed several opportunities to consider the benefits of multicul-
turalism or with interculturalism by examining a religious perspective. It did 
conduct religious analysis, however, and sided with conservative views. The 
question that arises is one of choosing internal narratives: Why did the Court 
endorse conservative interpretations concerning the veil?
64 Şahin v. Turkey, § 111.
65 Karaduman v. Turkey, 108.
66 Refah Partisi and Others v. Turkey 41340/98;41342/98;41343/98 and 41344/98 [2001] echr 
495 (31 July 2001) § 123.
67 Şahin v. Turkey, § 10.
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In all these cases, the Court used the margin of appreciation as the yardstick 
to measure the freedom of religion of an individual against the interests of the 
state. Yet, the balancing exercise between the rights of the individual and state 
interest did not take into account the cultural and religious beliefs of individu-
als and the veil as reflecting an identity. The argument put forward by Judge 
Spano and endorsed by Judge Karakas was that the majority of a society sets 
the tone, which explains why the court applied the principle at the expense of 
a minority.68 I suggest that the balancing effort of the Court should not rely on 
a negative depiction of Islam. The social reality of the veil as an instrument, as 
argued by Islamic feminists, has not been taken into consideration. I believe 
that Judge Spano’s argument about the majority vs. the minority view should 
be changed: the discussion should not be framed from the perspective of a 
majority holding democratic values vs. a minority associated with a security 
threat. Rather, the Court should endeavour to encourage a cross-cultural ex-
change. The Court should consider social, cultural, and religious beliefs as rel-
evant because its role is to champion the rights of the minority. In present-day 
Europe, which is de facto multicultural, I believe it is the role of the ECtHR to 
place religion in context and therefore to look beyond protection alone under 
Article 9 echr, at the risk of becoming the Court of some Europeans as op-
posed to others. To avoid doing so, the Court must embrace the subjectivity of 
the appellants; I am not calling for a sacrifice on the part of the collective, of 
living together, but for a consideration that the subjective experience of Euro-
pean Muslim women has a role to play.
It remains to be seen whether the argument of the veil as an emancipation 
tool will be considered in future ruling, and whether the Court will elaborate 
on the “well established feminist position”69 referred to in sas, which rein-
forces my case for the experiment: What if the ECtHR were to consider this al-
ternative religious narrative according to which the veil could empower some 
women? And what if the Court were to step away from conservative views on 
the veil, to look into other readings? The Court certainly did not choose to de-
velop its consideration of subjective views in the Belgian cases in 2017.
3.2 Consequences of the Rhetoric of the Court: The Exclusion of Women
The Karaduman, Dahlab, and Şahin cases, among others, dealt with religious 
paradigms against a secular backdrop and called into question the accommo-
dation of religious and cultural diversity. By opting for a stereotyped reading 
68 Belcacemi and Oussar v. Belgium, Opinion Concordante Du Juge Spano, à laquelle se rallie 
la Juge Karakas, §7.
69 Ibid., § 77.
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of the veil, rather than addressing the issue of religious pluralism in a secular 
society, the Court effectively excluded veiled Muslim women from the public 
sphere. Although the sas v. France case represented a shift in perspective, as 
it indirectly considered alternative views of the veil, the ECtHR still regarded 
the veil as an obstacle to socialization and to living together. The outcome of 
the sas case was therefore, yet again, exclusion: whereas before women were 
excluded on the ground of public safety and lack of gender equality, this time 
they were perceived as either unable to blend into society or as threatening 
the social fabric.70 The veil was seen as an obstacle to social life rather than 
examined as the opposite, an instrument for socialization. This is the opposite 
of the passport veil argument.
Yegenoglu characterized the reasoning of the Court as representative of co-
lonial fantasies: the veil is seen as a tool for controlling women’s bodies, and 
women are seen as powerless victims of patriarchy.71 It ignores the empowering 
readings of Islam, offered by Islamic feminists, and does not consider internal 
religious perspectives that seek equality. Yegenoglu also explained that the cas-
es establish a hierarchy, in which the West stands for gender equality, whereas 
religion and culture are factors that keep civilization behind.72 Mahmood criti-
cised the claim that secularism is by nature emancipatory whereas religion is 
“totalizing.”73 Razack went further, speaking of a policy of expulsion of Muslim 
women from European public spheres by means of three stereotypical figures: 
the imperilled Muslim women, the dangerous ones, and the civilized ones.74 In 
the ECtHR cases, the women who sought adjudication were associated with a 
dangerous category of Muslim women, whose veiling threatens public order or 
who are associated with the rise of extremism. When women are considered to 
be victims, the Court associates them with the imperilled women, subjected to 
Islam and patriarchy, lacking volition This turns women into what Malik called 
the “other” citizen.75 The outcome of the ECtHR case law is the “othering” of 
veiled Muslim women, which has led to their exclusion from the social sphere. 
70 Şahin v. Turkey, § 122.
71 Meyda Yegenoglu, Colonial fantasies: Towards a feminist reading of Orientalism (1998), 3–7.
72 Ibid.
73 Saba Mahmood, “Is Critique secular?”, 20(3) Public Culture (2008), 447–452, 449.
74 Sherene Razack, Casting Out: The Eviction of Muslims from Western Law and Politics (2008), 
146.
75 Maleiha Malik, “The ‘other’ citizen: religion in a multicultural Europe”, in Lorenzo  Zucca 
and Camil Ungureanu (eds.), Law, State and Religion in the New Europe: Debates and 
 Dilemmas (2012), 93–114.
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This exclusion from European society is the reason why it is urgent to press 
the Court to think differently and to try the proposed experiment, which could 
lead them to explore other readings of the role of the veil.
The outcome of the approach followed by the ECtHR is that a stereotyped 
version of Islam, stemming from a secular institution, replaces a conservative 
one, originating from the community. Both constitute an attempt to control 
women’s bodies, with the narrative of the Court relying on the argument of 
emancipation. The outcome is a European paternalism, in addition to Muslim 
paternalism, as women are told both “veil” and “do not veil.” In these circum-
stances, freedom of choice becomes crucial. It is a real issue for Muslim wom-
en to choose whether or not to veil; whether or not to marry; whether or not to 
work. All the rights established in international and regional documents have 
no value or function if the beneficiaries of those rights are not empowered 
to use them. Islamic feminists struggle to empower women to make choices 
and decide whether or not they want to use women’s rights, and within which 
framework they wish to do it. The ECtHR should strive to protect these women 
who seek empowerment by considering the arguments put forward regarding 
the passport veil. It should also encourage alternative views as well as an ex-
change of views, so that cultures can grow together in the European space. 
Instead, the Court has created its own narrative, using “gendered and idealized 
images of women as symbols of group identity.”76 It is clear that the purpose 
of the judges was to empower Muslim women, but the effect, as argued in this 
paper, is to violate the rights of these women using the very policies aimed 
at protecting them.77 Furthermore, as Radacic stressed, “in dismissing the 
perspective of a woman in question, the Court pitted the principle of gender 
equality against the principle of personal autonomy.”78 The consequence of 
putting personal autonomy face-to-face with gender equality is the sacrifice of 
the empowerment of the individual to society. As stated by Evans:
The women in these cases cease to be individuals with their own per-
sonalities, histories and concerns. Instead they become a symbol of the 
tension between the imagined West (secular, rational, egalitarian, human 
76 Ayelet Shachar, “Religion, State, and the Problem of Gender: New Modes of Citizenship 
and Governance in Diverse Societies”, 50 McGill L J (2005), 50.
77 Shachar, supra note 71, at 3.
78 Ivana Radacic, “Gender equality jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights”, 
19(4) ejil (2008), 841–857.
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rights respecting) and imagined Islam (religious fundamentalist, irratio-
nal, discriminatory and violative of human rights).79
Yet, the message of the Court is clear: the only possibility for empowerment 
à l’européenne is to shed the veil. This process of exclusion of elements that 
do not match European values is described by Soirila: veiled Muslim women 
are treated as a “biopolitical risk” that needs to be “normalized” to “disappear 
into the mass of the mainstream population, or be excluded from the society.” 
 According to Soirila, the ECtHR cannot avoid biopolitical aims, and fulfils 
them “through discourses that the judges partake of and in cases where the 
margin of discretion of the Strasbourg judges or the national authorities is 
increased.80” It seems indeed that some Muslim women have become politi-
cal pawns in a chess game, and are being compelled to choose between their 
multiple identities. The division into Muslim women between good ones, who 
have integrated into society by not wearing a veil, and the dangerous ones, who 
represent a risk, or the imperilled ones, who are oppressed, should be evaluat-
ed against the critical framework suggested by Mahmood, who denounces the 
idea that there is a conflict between secular necessity and religious threat.81 
I argue that by considering these women to be a danger to secularism, the 
ECtHR adopts a laicist understanding of secularism, in which religion becomes 
the opponent of the state and society. The Court adheres to the dichotomy that 
one is either against secular values, or in their favor. If “we” do not defend secu-
lar values and lifestyles, it is argued, “they,” often Islamic extremists, will take 
over our liberal freedoms and institutions.82 Religion in the public sphere be-
comes a potential danger, and it is necessary to relegate it to the private sphere. 
As a result, secularism becomes a way of controlling religion, which is obvi-
ous when the Court displays fear of indoctrination in Dahlab and in Ciftci.83 
The attempt to control religion assumed a new form first in the sas case, and 
now in the Belcacemi and Oussar and Dakir cases, the threat having evolved 
from raw Islamic extremism to the subtle undermining of society by veiled 
women. In such circumstances, the veil cannot be allowed to operate as a pass-
port and can serve only as a religious id card for living in the private sphere. 
79 Carolyn Evans, “The ‘Islamic Scarf ’ in the European Court of Human Rights”, 7(1) Melb. J. 
Int’l L. (2006), 52, 67, 71.
80 Ukri Soirila, “The European Court of Human Rights, Islam and Foucauldian Biopower”, 2 
hlr (2011), 365–400, 365.
81 Mahmood, supra note 124, 449.
82 Ibid.
83 Evrim Ciftçi v. Turkey 59640/00 [2005] echr 768 (29 November 2005).
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A visa would be granted only if the woman agreed to unveil. This privatization 
of religion operated by the Court is clearly an issue for veiled Muslim women 
who use a religious or cultural symbol to leave the private sphere and enter the 
public sphere. Their passport is not considered valid by the Court. This is why 
I encourage the Court to experiment by looking into other readings of the veil, 
including internal narratives, so that the judges can contribute to developing 
a model of secularism that relies on a Rawlsian overlapping consensus.84 In 
this model of secular state, a veiled woman would be treated equally with all 
other citizens and would contribute to what she thinks the general good is. 
The state would adopt a neutral stance toward Muslim women’s beliefs, and 
in return, they would contribute to society by becoming empowered and play-
ing a public role. This framework may entitle veiled Muslim women to move 
within a rather neutral space in which Islam would play a role. According to 
advocates of multiculturalism, this would also have a positive effect on cohe-
sion of society. There would be a flow of cultural exchange that would cause 
society to grow, validating interculturalism as the way forward. This solution 
can have far-reaching consequences for the way in which secularism is per-
ceived in countries like France, and at the same time point the way to making 
multiculturalism and interculturalism a reality.
The result of grasping the veil as a political issue rather than perceiving 
it through the lens of women’s stories and subjective views is that the Court 
approaches veiled Muslim women as objects rather than beings in control of 
their own lives. The judges’ attitude is a negation not only of feminism but also 
of Islam, an attitude that has been perceived as racist or colonial.85 It is clear 
that the Court is not expected to follow any agenda or engage in judicial activ-
ism that would be detrimental to its mission. But considering Islamic femi-
nisms would provide alternative routes to empowerment and gender equality.
4 sas v France and Prospects Beyond 2017: Living Together as a  
New Yardstick
Next, I recommend changing the stance of the Court by pushing my experimen-
tation further, investigating what turn the experiment might take if the ECtHR 
either adopted a theological approach or focused on personal narratives.
84 Jocelyn Maclure and Charles Taylor, Secularism and Freedom of Conscience (2011), 11–12.
85 Ibid., 67.
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4.1 The “Living Together” Argument: us vs. Them
I analyze the ECtHR as a forum for the suggested experiment because it has a 
framework for thinking about freedom of religion and uses instruments, such 
as proportionality and the margin of appreciation; it provides a strong basis 
for the legal reasoning that rejects wearing the veil in a public place. The Court 
has built an understanding of the role of religion in public life and of the in-
teractions between religious minorities and the state. Yet, this conception is 
exclusive rather than inclusive, as it grants a wide margin of appreciation to 
the States when it comes to making decisions about whether or not interfer-
ence with freedom of religion is needed.
By referring to living together in the sas case, the Court sidelined religion. 
The ECtHR respected the approaches to law of nation states. The Court em-
braced the French and the Belgian “living together” argument to protect the 
majority of the citizens. The outcome has been dire, leading to the exclusion 
of the minority. The argument of those who live together according to some 
values leads to rejecting those who do not, defeating the very purpose of mul-
ticulturalism. Therefore, trying to advance an intercultural agenda through the 
Court seems like endeavour doomed to failure. The outcome of the sas case 
needs to be questioned if they do not take into account the views of minorities 
living within their borders. The argument that only someone who shows her 
full face (sas addressed full-face banning) can be part of the French society, 
effectively creates an “us vs. them” society, in which women wearing a full-
face veil, willingly or not, are sidelined by the state. Such extreme situations, in 
which veiled women become invisible to society must be avoided as much as 
situations in which women are considered a hazard to society and are prevent-
ed from wearing burkini on the beach as seen in France in the summer of 2016.
Empirical findings, such as those presented by Silvestri86 and Brems,87 are 
crucial for understanding the reason why the veil is perceived as emancipatory 
by some women. It is also necessary to develop a theoretical framework based 
on socio-legal studies to assess the importance of the actions of the Court with 
regard to veiling and unveiling. My focus of the ECtHR is explained by the fact 
that the Court plays a crucial role in changing the judicial landscape of Europe. 
The Court is in a position to influence the behaviour of its member states with 
regard to multiculturalism, interculturalism, and cultural diversity, often refer-
ring to a broad margin of appreciation in the matter. This is why the ECtHR 
needs to be encouraged to realize what the consequences of its decisions are 
for the European Muslim minority. Judges should be encouraged to examine 
86 Silvestri, supra note 78.
87 Eva Brems, The Experiences of Face Veil Wearers in Europe and the Law (2014).
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the issue of religion and secular affairs differently, by analyzing the narratives 
of veiled European Muslim women, to reflect their needs and protect them 
better. The dynamics of rights vs societal change is thus at the core of the issue 
at hand. The ECtHR is expected not only to voice an opinion on the limits of 
freedom of religion under Article 9; it is also expected to weigh in on the role 
of religion in society and to understand that part of its mission is to medi-
ate between law and social practices to reinforce social cohesion. The Court, 
therefore, plays an important role in bringing all identities and legal subjectivi-
ties together under the umbrella of the law. This is why I call for the Court to 
develop an all-inclusive framework and instruments to deal with religion and 
symbols of religion in public life, beyond the margin of appreciation.
The question of bias and of preferential treatment may be raised if the Court 
were to consider subjective narratives of a minority. Such an argument, how-
ever, would not take into consideration the stakes of the passport veil that exist 
for the Muslim minority, such as women’s empowerment. Indeed, the issue 
goes beyond the passport veil; it is also about how the ECtHR approaches the 
role of religion, pluralism, multiculturalism, and interculturalism in Europe. 
The ECtHR should endeavour to examine the issues that are deeply embed-
ded in society, such as social characteristics, by listening to those who struggle 
to contribute to living together, so that their inclusion may be improved. The 
German Constitutional Court has followed this path in a decision88 in which 
it took into account the discrimination that women encountered when veiled. 
Judges considered the fact that women were forced to deny their religion to 
obtain employment and good living conditions. Such inclusion of alternative 
views about women did not constitute a preferential treatment but a way of 
accommodating the other to reinforce social cohesion. Consequently, my ex-
periment raises the question of the role of courts when it comes to addressing 
multiculturalism and to “re-orient legal thinking to allow adequate recognition 
of (these) conditions.”89
4.2 Social Cohesion and Living Together
The sas case, followed by the 2017 cases, curbed freedom of religion on the 
basis of protection of living together. The rationale for these decisions was that 
the full and partial face veil undermined the social cohesion of France, and the 
country could rely on its wide margin of appreciation to interfere with free-
dom of religion:
88 Ludin v. Land Baden-Wurttemberg (“Lehrerin mit Kopftuch”), 2 BvR 1436/02, 24 September 
2003.
89 Roger Cotterrell, “Culture, Power and the Human Animal: A Reply”, 4 Int J. L. C. (2008), 407.
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The Court takes into account the respondent State’s point that the face 
plays an important role in social interaction. It can understand the view 
that individuals who are present in places open to all may not wish to see 
practices or attitudes developing there which would fundamentally call 
into question the possibility of open interpersonal relationships, which, 
by virtue of an established consensus, forms an indispensable element of 
community life within the society in question. The Court is therefore able 
to accept that the barrier raised against others by a veil concealing the 
face is perceived by the respondent State as breaching the right of others 
to live in a space of socialisation which makes living together easier.90
Although the concept of living together is a “very general concept,” as well as 
“far-fetched and vague,”91 it still has a deep meaning and emphasizes the idea 
of “us versus them.” In this rhetoric, the other, the veiled Muslim woman, is 
showing her inability or refusal to integrate in society and should therefore 
be side-lined for fear of affecting national cohesion. She is thus reduced to be-
ing a veiled woman rather than being a woman wearing the veil. In contrast, 
the argument of the passport veil rejects the idea that women refuse integra-
tion. It relies on research analyzing why women veil wear the veil to integrate 
society.92
Cotterrell’s perspective that justice acts as a lubricant for the mechanisms of 
society to “ensure smooth, complex interplay of social and economic roles and 
functions93” is challenged in these circumstances. According to Cotterrell, the 
role of the law is to remove barriers and actively motivate individuals to play 
their part into society. I believe this is also true of the courts. Courts play an im-
portant role through their contribution to democracy and human rights, both 
of which are elements framing the mission of the ECtHR. By citing the need 
to keep social cohesion intact, to ensure that all live together, the Court plays 
its role as a lubricant. This is accomplished, however, at the expense of social, 
cultural, or religious values, integrating or excluding these values according to 
the benchmark of the margin of appreciation.
The Court adopted the French idea that social cohesion is defined as our 
ability to rally around common values, rejecting the other as unfit. As summed 
90 sas v. France, § 122.
91 Dissenting Opinion, sas v. France, §5.
92 Open Society Foundation. 2011. “Unveiling the truth: why 32 Muslim women, wear the 
fullface veil in France”. Open Society Foundation. Retrieved 17 February 2017, http://www 
.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/a-unveiling-the-truth-20100510_0.pdf
93 Roger Cotterrell, “Justice, dignity, torture, headscarves: can Durkeim sociology clarify 
legal values?”, 20 Soc. & Leg. Stud. (2011), 3–20, 7.
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up by a French politician, “social cohesion presupposes acceptance that oth-
ers can look at you.”94 This acceptance seems to be denied to citizens when 
others are veiled, causing a sense of unease, as demonstrated by the facts of 
the Dahlab case and by the security argument put forward in the Belcacemi 
and Oussar case. It then becomes the mission of the Court to ensure that there 
is no social conflict in upholding social cohesion. Yet, that consideration of 
the principle of “living together” would lead to the marginalization of some 
citizens, denying them the opportunity for upward mobility. The current case 
law demands a reevaluation of the social contract to reflect on how we con-
sider European veiled Muslim women and of the role they can play in society 
and the contribution they can make to it. None should be excluded, and the 
Court should be reminded that “the collective thrives by allowing individuals 
to thrive.”95 Furthermore, marginalization can have uncontrolled effects, such 
as driving religious, cultural, and traditional practices underground, threaten-
ing women’s rights.
The Court is in a position to renegotiate the social contract and make it 
more inclusive. In this regard, Binmore’s model,96 distinguishing between so-
cial norms and social preferences is relevant to the passport veil. In the cur-
rent state of affairs, the ECtHR considers undefined social norms as paramount 
(for example, public safety) as the expense of social preferences. According to 
Binmore, however, social preferences should be respected to encourage social 
bonding and collective life. Rather than excluding and losing individual ele-
ments, everything must be done to include them to ensure social cohesion. 
The idea is to maximize the freedom of the individual to choose within a 
framework, knowing that preferences are limited by preferences of others. As 
explained by Gintis, however, “social norms are an emergent property of hu-
man sociality, and exist as macrosocial structures that are not reducible to the 
preferences of individuals.”97 Binmore noted that it is indeed difficult to “for-
mulate a coherent theory of social preferences unless one has a systemic mod-
el of social norms existing outside of the system of individual preferences.”98 
The ECtHR is asked to mediate social preferences and social norms, without 
94 Bill prohibiting concealment of the face – Speech by Michèle Alliot, Ministre d’Etat, 
Keeper of the Seals, Minister of Justice and Freedom, at the Senate (excerpts), Paris, 
 September 14 , 2010, http://www.ambafrance-us.org/spip.php?article1853.
95 Ibid.
96 Ken Binmore, Natural Justice (2005).
97 Herbert Gintis, “Reply to Binmore: Social Norms or Social Preferences?” 2011. Retrived 
17 February 2017, http://www.umass.edu/preferen/gintis/ReplyToBinmore.pdf.
98 Ibid.
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leaning toward an untenable individualism.99 In that regard, the rationale of 
the un Committee when addressing the refusal by India to renew a residence 
permit without a bareheaded photograph is of interest. It questioned the ar-
guments made by India that an id photograph of a Sikh with a turban was a 
security issue. The committee proposed a shift of burden from the individual 
to the state, arguing that unless the state was able to determine the security 
threat, freedom of religion has to be respected. Social preferences are there-
fore tolerated as long as the state cannot prove that they are harmful to social 
cohesion.100,101
Social preferences should therefore not be a factor in the exclusion of 
 European Muslim women wearing a veil from membership in society. This 
represents a challenge for the Court, which must ensure a strong attachment 
to society at the micro and macro levels. I believe the veil constitutes an excel-
lent passport for this membership, if the veil is approached as an indicator or 
“membership attitude”102 rather than what severs or weakens the link to soci-
ety. I believe that tolerance of social preferences such as the passport veil will 
empower women experiencing a cognitive dissonance to fully belong to the 
European public sphere; it is best than a model of social cohesion according to 
which individuals are expected to show loyalty by unveiling.
4.3 The Approach of the Court to the Veil: A Theological Argument or a 
Subjective Narrative?
Judges appear not to be engaging with religion outside Article 9. Religion re-
mains largely unintelligible to the Court and the States, to the extent that “eras-
ing its public evidence seems to have become the most unanimously adopted 
posture.”103 This is why having experts provide knowledge about the different 
views on the veil would be useful. For this experiment to take place, the fol-
lowing question of method must be answered: How is the Court expected to 
proceed when considering accommodating alternative religious perspectives? 
Should the Court focus on a theological argument, assessing the multiple un-
derstandings of the veil, as I suggested above? Or should it, instead, rethink the 
99 Herbert Gintis, The Bounds of Reason: Game Theory and the Unification of the Behavioral 
Sciences (2009).
100 Ranjit Singh v. France, Communication No. 1876/2009, U.N. Doc. ccpr/C/102/D/1876/2009 
(2011), § 8.4.
101 Peter M. Gerhart, Tort Law and Social Morality (2013), 16.
102 Noah E. Friedkin, “Social Cohesion”, 30 Annu. Rev. Sociol (2004), 409.
103 Valerie Amiraux, “The ‘illegal covering’ saga: what’s next? Sociological perspectives” 19(6) 
si (2013), 794–806, 798.
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balance between state and society on one hand, and individuals on the other. 
This is an important question because it addresses the role of the judge: Should 
judges consider religious, cultural, or traditional matters, or should they look 
into personal motivations?
The Court has conducted theological assessments in the past.104 This is why 
I argue for such an assessment: it addressed the veil as a religious instrument 
for purposes of proselytizing and coercion. The Suku Phull case on the tur-
ban105 illustrates this tendency: in that case, the judges looked at the turban 
as a religious obligation. The ruling is mitigated by the Mann Singh case, in 
which the Court looked into individuals’ beliefs rather than into theology, stat-
ing that:
[a]ccording to the applicant, the Sikh faith compels its members to wear 
a turban in all circumstances. It is not only considered at the heart of 
their religion, but also at the heart of their identity. Consequently, the 
Court notes that it consists of an act motivated or inspired by a religion 
or a conviction.106 
Later, however, the Court returned to making theological assessment as to 
whether or not the turban was compulsory.107 Two options are available in my 
experiment: the ECtHR could either go back to the Mann Singh case, which 
focuses on a subjective individual narrative, or retain its theological approach 
and consider other readings of a religious instrument. I have proposed a theo-
logical argument in this article, based on the preferences of the Court, but an 
argument in favour of considering subjective narratives exists, and has has 
also appeared in this article, indirectly.. Subjectivity was considered in Raihon 
Hudoyberganova v. Uzbekistan, which involved coercion (a student was expulsed 
from university for refusing to remove her veil),108 as Ms. Hudoyberganova’s sta-
tus as a victim was acknowledged.
For the sake of our experiment, note that another forum, the un Human 
Rights Committee, approached the issue of the turban differently,  questioning 
104 See the analysis by Saila Ouald Chaib, “Suku Phull v. France rewritten from a procedural 
justice perspective: Taking religious minorities seriously”, in Eva Brems (ed.), Diversity and 
European human rights: Rewriting judgments of the echr (2013), 218–242, 229.
105 Suku Phull v. France, 35753/03 [2005] echr (11 January 2005).
106 Mann Singh v. France, 24479/07 [2008] echr (27 November 2008).
107 Jasvir Singh v. France, 25463/08 [2009] echr (30 June 2009) and Ranjit Singh v France 
27561/08 [2009] echr (30 June 2009).
108 Raihon Hudoyberganova v. Uzbekistan, Communication No. 931/2000, Views of 5 Novem-
ber 2004.
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whether the wearing of a turban would affect safety by preventing proper iden-
tification. In its reasoning, the Committee focused on the right of the individu-
al, which it stated that needed to be protected.109 The Committee balanced the 
collective and individual rights differently from the ECtHR, to prevent unnec-
essary curbing of freedom of religion, and considered that the state rationale 
of public safety was not demonstrated in this case:
[E]ven if the obligation to remove the turban for the identity photograph 
might be described as a one-time requirement, it would potentially inter-
fere with the author’s freedom of religion on a continuing basis because 
he would always appear without his religious head covering in the iden-
tity photograph and could therefore be compelled to remove his turban 
during identity checks.110
Therefore, the Committee examined the indirect consequences of an id photo 
without turban for an individual whose identity was associated with his reli-
gious beliefs. The position of the Committee demonstrates that it is possible 
to have a better understanding of the applicant’s religious, cultural, and tradi-
tional views, than that demonstrated by the ECtHR as long as such elements do 
not undermine public safety and as long as the state if able to define, explain, 
and justify such a threat. The Committee did not seek to debate any religious, 
cultural, or traditional beliefs that would be problematic, but rather to find a 
better-suited yardstick. The yardstick remains the necessary limitation of in-
dividual freedom of religion to protect state interests, if the state is able to 
demonstrate a risk. The position of the Committee illustrates that it is possible 
and necessary to ask real questions rather than use broad concepts such as 
public safety and living together at face value. This approach of the Commit-
tee shows that the wide margin of appreciation of the ECtHR must be recon-
sidered and the balancing that leads to the “sacrifice”111 of individual rights 
questioned. In January 2015, the German Constitutional Court concluded that 
although it was possible to curb individual human rights to protect the inter-
ests of the state, such limitation would have to be based on concrete facts rath-
er than prejudiced views.112 There should be sufficient concrete evidence that 
109 Ranjit Singh v. France, supra note 159.
110 Ibid.
111 Bikramjit Singh v. France, Communication No. 1852/2008, u.n. Doc. ccpr/C/106/D/1852/ 
2008 (2013), § 8.7.
112 Case unnamed, 1 B v R 471/10 and 1 B v R 1181/10, 27 January 2015.
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 wearing the veil by a teacher would undermine the peaceful atmosphere in 
the school.  Domestic courts have therefore taken the lead in this matter, using 
a contextualized approach to the veil, taking Islamophobia into consideration, 
and showing respect for women’s religious identity. Nevertheless, the difficulty 
of practicing cultural diversity in the courts remains a reality, as stressed by 
Shachar.113 Yet, the ECtHR could practice cultural diversity by providing “an 
adequate balance between respecting cultural difference and protecting indi-
vidual rights.”114
The reason for arguing in favor of the consideration of an “individual exog-
enous factor(s)”115 or for a theological argument is that it may help reinforce 
national cohesion. In the case of the passport veil, considered either as a sub-
jective individual statement, or from a theological point of view, I argue that it 
is necessary for the Court to be aware of the existence of an alternative under-
standing of the role of the veil. Such understanding would give a whole new 
meaning to living together and to the content of social cohesion.
5 Conclusion
By integrating Islamic feminism in its considerations on veiling into a secu-
lar context, the Court could enrich its vision and provide better protection of 
freedom of religion. This demands a more coherent approach to the margin of 
appreciation, using such elements as the passport veil. This also means that 
the Court needs to start regarding Muslim women wearing a veil as empow-
ered subjects, rather than seeing them as victims and objects. The Eremia case 
may contribute to this shift, as it focuses on the effect that law has on women, 
regarding them as subjects,116 as does the Hudoyberganova case, which con-
sidered the effect of being ousted for a student.117 In the Eremia case, the ap-
plicant was the victim of domestic violence, who argued that the state had 
failed to protect her, in breach of the law. The ECtHR supported that argument 
and investigated the effect that legislation and its breach have on  vulnerable 
113 Shachar, supra note 5.
114 Shachar, supra note 71, 88.
115 Hector Fix-Fierro, Courts, Justice, and Efficiency: A Socio-legal Study of Economic Rational-
ity in Adjudication (2004), 55.
116 Eremia and Others v. the Republic of Moldova (28 May 2013).
117 Raihon Hudoyberganova v. Uzbekistan, § 50.
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individuals.118 The argument followed by the Court was that domestic violence 
affects women  disproportionately and differently, which should be  considered 
in the decision.119 The ECtHR appears to have shifted its substantive approach 
to equality under Article 14 and its approach to formal equality to a focus 
on harm and indirect discrimination. The Eremia case investigated the way 
in which discrimination is experienced from the perspective of the victim, 
examining the effects of a law to evaluate whether it causes or perpetuates 
disadvantage, discrimination, exclusion, or oppression. The shift of focus is a 
crucial change of perception, which could affect Muslim women positively, 
possibly addressing their cognitive dissonance, now that the focus is on how 
discrimination is experienced. In Europe, Muslim women experience mul-
tiple identities, and at times struggle to reconcile their religious beliefs with 
societal  beliefs. This can create a cognitive dissonance: veiled Muslim women 
struggle to reconcile their belief in wearing the veil with their contribution to 
society.120 This dissonance can be exacerbated by decisions such as the ones 
in domestic or regional courts that describe the veil as a threat to the secular 
order or an instrument of women’s oppression. Thanks to the Eremia case, the 
Court can now change the focus on the veil from that of a tool of propagation 
of extremism and oppression to examining the disadvantage, discrimination, 
exclusion, and oppression experienced by veiled women.121
The integration of veiled Muslim women in society is of great importance 
for human rights as well as for the evaluation of the role of culture, religion, 
and traditions in Europe. I do not suggest that all beliefs and values should 
be accommodated, but that the ECtHR must refine its test to ensure at least 
proper consideration before discarding them, if necessary, in a clear and con-
structive manner. The way in which the Court addresses the issue of the veil 
can have a beneficial effect on multiculturalism, and perhaps on intercultur-
alism. The hope is that the experiment suggested in this article provides an 
118 Eremia case, supra note 170, § 50 and § 60.
119 Ibid., § 60.
120 Yvonne Yazbeck-Haddad, Muslims in the West: from Sojourners to Citizens (2002), 115.
121 This shift is completed by another important change in the Court’s reading of Article 14: 
in the B.S. v. Spain case (B.S. v. Spain 47159/08 [2012] echr (24 October 2012), the Court 
adopted an intersectional approach which is an important contribution to the consid-
eration of feminist theories (Keina Yoshida, “Towards intersectionality in the European 
Court of Human Rights: the case of B.S. v Spain” 21(2) Fem. Legal Stud. (2013), 195). Inte-
grating intersectionality completes the changes brought to perceptions of discrimination 
and its effect on the outcomes on Muslim women.
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illustration of both multiculturalism and interculturalism. I built on Cantle’s 
view who wishes to see culture and religion in constant evolution, which led 
me to the idea of a passport that enables crossing borders. I also challenged 
the idea of tolerance of Islamic feminism, as “tolerance always presupposes 
a control over what is tolerated.”122 My suggestion was rather for the ECtHR 
judges to embrace diversity by supporting the creation of European Muslim 
women’s identities.
122 Ghassan Hage, White Nation: Fantasies of White Supremacy in a Multicultural Society 
(2000), 89.
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